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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is indeed ironic that the United Nations (U.N.), which has been 
instrumental in setting norms in the area of gender equality,1 now stands 
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accused of egregious acts of sexual abuse and exploitation committed by 
U.N. peacekeepers and civilian personnel.2 After a decade of virtual 
inaction, the United Nations has taken some preliminary measures to 
address the problem following the disclosure of such abuse. However, far-
reaching changes in peacekeeping operations and contractual obligations 
of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) must be implemented in order 
to deal with this serious issue and to change the culture of dismissiveness 
pervading peacekeeping operations. Numerous proposals for reform have 
been urged by NGOs (non-government organizations) and Member States 
and are included in a report by Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Prince 
Zeid), A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation 
and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Zeid Report),3 
that was prepared at the request of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. 
The Zeid Report was endorsed by the Security Council and the General 
Assembly,4 and it has both formed the basis for action by those bodies and 
been a catalyst for some of the reforms already implemented. This Article 
analyzes and assesses the proposed reforms and implementation and 
discusses the additional action that must be taken by Member States and 
the U.N. in order to eliminate sexual abuse and exploitation in 
peacekeeping missions.  
II. MEDIA DISCLOSURE OF SEXUAL ABUSE AND EXPLOITATION 
Although reports of sexual abuse or misconduct by U.N. peacekeepers 
or civilian personnel first surfaced more than a decade ago,5 the 
international media paid scant attention to such allegations. However, the 
 
 
 1. The most significant and widely ratified international agreement making reference to the 
rights of women is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations has also promulgated several 
treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which guarantee gender equality. In addition, it has 
promulgated the comprehensive Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women. See, e.g., Malvina Halberstam & Elizabeth Defeis, Women’s Legal Rights: 
International Covenants an Alternative to ERA? (Transnational Publications) (1988).  
 2. See U.N. Says Scores Of Peacekeepers Ousted for Abuse, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2006, at A23; 
Sarah Lyall, Aid Workers Are Said to Abuse Girls, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2006, at A8. 
 3. U.N. GEN. ASSEMBLY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO ELIMINATE FUTURE SEXUAL 
EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, U.N. Doc. A/59/710 
(Mar. 24, 2005) (prepared by Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein) [hereinafter ZEID REPORT]. 
 4. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns ‘in the Strongest Terms’ All 
Acts of Sexual Abuse, Exploitation by UN Peacekeeping Personnel, U.N. Doc. SC/8400 (May 31, 
2005). 
 5. See Olivia Ward, Scandal Blackens U.N. ‘Blue Helmets,’ TORONTO STAR, Mar. 26, 2005, at 
A10. “Allegations of misconduct have . . . surfaced in Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Ivory Coast, Burundi . . . , Haiti, and Congo.” Id. 
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shocking acts of abuse of the U.N. peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, Guinea, 
and Liberia were widely reported in the press.6 This negative publicity, 
coupled with intensive press coverage of other areas, such as the oil-for-
food scandal, has caused the U.N. and many of its Member States to urge 
reform and increased accountability of U.N. military and civilian 
personnel implicated in violations of human rights.7 
Sexual abuse and exploitation was first documented “in Bosnia, 
Herzegovina and Kosovo in the early 1990s, [and] then later in 
Mozambique, Cambodia, East Timor and Liberia.”8 Abuses included 
sexual exploitation of children, pornography, and sexual assaults, “but it 
was not until the widespread allegations of abuse emerged in the DRC 
[Democratic Republic of Congo] in mid-2004 that numerous high-level 
[U.N.] officials responded to the charges.”9 Secretary-General Annan 
acknowledged that acts of gross misconduct had clearly taken place 
stating:  
This is a shameful thing for the United Nations to have to say, and I 
am absolutely outraged by it. 
. . . .  
 
 
 6. The BBC website, for example, carried five articles on the issue in the month following the 
leaking of a report by the UNHCR in conjunction with the British-based charity Save the Children. 
Child Refugee Sex Scandal, BBC NEWS, Feb. 26, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/ 
1842512.stm; Aid-for-Sex Children Speak Out, BBC NEWS, Feb. 27, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/ 
Africa/1843930.stm; African Refugees Condemn Sex Abuses, BBC NEWS, Feb. 28, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/1847483.stm; Sex-for-Aid Under U.N. Spotlight, BBC NEWS, Mar. 8, 
2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/1861763.stm; Britons in Sex-for-Aid Scandal, BBC NEWS, 
Mar. 18, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/1878063.stm. According to the U.N. Peacekeeping 
Department’s Conduct and Discipline Team, the U.N. has repatriated thirty-seven peacekeepers for 
sexual exploitation and abuse: twelve from Nepal, seven from Uruguay, four from Nigeria, four from 
Senegal, two from Benin, two from Ethiopia, two from Togo, and one each from France, Ghana, India, 
Niger and South Africa. U.N. Says Scores of Peacekeepers Ousted for Abuse, supra note 2. 
 7. Column Lynch, U.N. Panel Says 2,400 Firms Paid Bribes to Iraq; Oil-for-Food Program 
Report Alleges $1.8 Billion in Payments, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2005, at A16.  
 8. GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, U.N. REFORMS AIM TO END SEXUAL ABUSE BY PEACEKEEPERS 
(2005), http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/2005/0510conduct.htm. In November 
2001, a report prepared by consultants retained by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and Save the Children UK presented allegations of widespread sexual 
exploitation of female refugees in the UNHCR camps by international and national aid workers in 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In response to those allegations, the UNHCR asked the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to conduct an investigation into the allegations. Beginning in 
February 2002, an OIOS Investigation Team undertook to 1) attempt to verify the allegations 
presented in the consultants’ report, which were based on third person accounts, and 2) to determine 
whether sufficient evidence exists to prove cases of sexual exploitation by aid workers and 
peacekeepers in either criminal or administrative proceedings. 
 9. See id.  
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 . . . I have long made it clear that my attitude to sexual 
exploitation and abuse is one of zero tolerance, without exception, 
and I am determined to implement this policy in the most 
transparent manner.10 
The Secretary-General acknowledged that the procedures in place 
“were manifestly inadequate and that a fundamental change in approach 
was needed.”11 In 2004, Prince Zeid12 was appointed by Secretary-General 
Annan to investigate and report on possible abuse.13 In March 2005, 
Prince Zeid issued the Zeid Report, detailing pervasive abuse and 
exploitation of women and girls,14 most of which involved trading sex for 
money,15 food, or jobs.16 Just as disturbing were acts of rape disguised as 
prostitution, where victims were given gifts after being assaulted in order 
to give the impression that the sex act was one of prostitution rather than 
rape.17 Victims of abuse were often abandoned with children to care for, 
so-called “peacekeeper babies,” without any family to care for them.18  
However, more than a year after the announcement of the widely 
heralded zero-tolerance policy, Prince Zeid, in a confidential report 
obtained by the London Times, said, “[t]he situation appears to be one of 
‘zero-compliance with zero tolerance’ throughout the mission.”19 
 
 
 10. Press Release, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Secretary-General ‘Absolutely Outraged’ by 
Gross Misconduct by Peacekeeping Personnel in Democratic Republic of Congo, U.N. Doc. 
SG/SM/9605 (Nov. 19, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9605. 
doc.htm. 
 11. Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly, United Nations, 
U.N. Doc. A/59/710 (Mar. 24, 2005). The Secretary-General’s letter annexed the Zeid Report. ZEID 
REPORT, supra note 3.  
 12. Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein is the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United 
Nations and a former peacekeeper. Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the General 
Assembly, supra note 11. 
 13. Secretary-General Office of the Spokesperson, Secretary-General’s Statement on Prince 
Zeid’s Report “A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN 
Peacekeeping Operations,” (Mar. 24, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid= 
1362 (last visited Feb. 9, 2008). 
 14. ZEID REPORT, supra note 3. 
 15. Id. ¶ 6. According to the Zeid Report, remuneration averaged $1–$3 for each encounter. Id. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Jonathan Clayton & James Bone, Sex Scandal in Congo Threatens to Engulf UN’s 
Peacekeepers, THE TIMES (London), Dec. 23, 2004, at 25; See also SARAH MARTIN, REFUGEES INT’L, 
MUST BOYS BE BOYS? ENDING SEXUAL EXPLOITATION & ABUSE IN UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS 
(2005), http://www.refugeesinternational.org/files/6976_file_FINAL_MustBoys.pdf. Refugees 
International (RI), an NGO advocacy group, issued a report that is critical of the virtual inaction of the 
U.N. and the culture that continues to exist in peacekeeping missions. The report stated that: 
[T]he process of mainstreaming gender into peacekeeping missions, or incorporating gender 
perspectives into all areas of work, has yet to truly take hold within the UN missions that RI 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss2/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] AN END TO IMPUNITY 189 
 
 
 
 
In October 2005, the New York Times marked the U.N.’s sixtieth 
anniversary with a scathing editorial on sexual abuse by U.N. 
peacekeepers.20 It said: 
Nothing discredits the United Nations more than the continuing 
sexual abuse of women and girls by soldiers belonging to its 
international peacekeeping missions. And yet almost a year after 
shocking disclosures about such crimes in Congo, far too little has 
been done to end the culture of impunity, exploitation and sexual 
chauvinism that permits them to go on.  
 The whole purpose of these missions is to help countries ravaged 
by civil or international conflict restore stability, guarantee public 
security and instill the rule of law. When United Nations 
peacekeepers rape the people they were sent to protect and coerce 
women and girls to trade sex for food, as they were found to have 
done in Congo last winter, they defeat the purpose of their mission 
and exploit some of the world’s most vulnerable people.21 
During his last month in office, December 2006, Secretary-General 
Annan acknowledged, “[m]y message of zero-tolerance has still not got 
through to all those who need to hear it—from managers and commanders 
on the ground, to all our other personnel.”22  
In January 2007, widespread allegations of sexual exploitation by U.N. 
peacekeeping forces in southern Sudan were reported by the media. 
Allegations included the systematic rape and abuse of children as young as 
twelve.23 According to the report, the first allegations emerged shortly 
 
 
visited . . . . The policies and guidelines set by [the] UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) about sexual exploitation and abuse in missions are not always followed 
in the field. 
Id. at ii. 
 20. Editorial, The Worse U.N. Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at A20. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Press Release, Secretary-General Kofi-Annan, Sexual Exploitation ‘Utterly Immoral’, 
Completely at Odds with United Nations Mission, says Secretary-General to New York Conference, 
U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10776 (Dec. 4, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/ 
sgsm10776.doc.htm. Annan acknowledged:  
. . . Allegations of exploitation and abuse are being handled in a more systematic and 
professional manner. Staff who commit such acts are fired. And uniformed peacekeeping 
personnel are being sent home and barred from future peacekeeping service, and also in the 
expectation that their own Governments will deal with them. 
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS YEAR IN REVIEW 2006: NEW CHALLENGES, NEW 
HORIZONS 21 (2007), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpkp/pub/year_review06/YIR2006. 
pdf [hereinafter U.N. YEAR REVIEW]. 
 23. Kate Holt & Sarah Hughes, U.N. Staff Accused of Raping Children in Sudan, THE DAILY 
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after the arrival of U.N. forces and were the subject of a 2005 internal 
UNICEF report detailing the problem.24 Responding to these allegations 
the U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping acknowledged, 
“[t]here could be truth [in the allegations]. . . . We need to ascertain the 
facts and follow it through to appropriate resolution and take action if 
necessary. . . . We won’t be complacent and there will be no impunity to 
the full extent of the U.N.’s authority.”25 However, a U.N. official on the 
ground in Sudan insisted that the peacekeeping mission was following 
correct codes of conduct, stating, “[w]e are applying a standard of morality 
that is very, very high but we cannot expect that soldiers when they go 
abroad are going to behave themselves as we think they should.”26  
In response to these new allegations, newly appointed Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon reaffirmed the U.N.’s zero-tolerance policy and 
stated: “The U.N. standard on the issue is clear—zero tolerance, meaning 
zero complacency and zero impunity. . . . It is the U.N.’s policy to treat 
credible allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse as serious offences to 
be investigated by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).”27 
U.N. Watch, a Geneva based NGO, has requested that the Secretary-
General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights establish an 
international, independent inquiry into allegations reported in Sudan.28 
III. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO SEXUAL ABUSE AND EXPLOITATION 
Peacekeeping operations have been one of the most successful 
initiatives launched by the United Nations; in 1988 the Nobel Peace Prize 
was awarded to U.N. peacekeeping forces.29 Peacekeepers serve under 
 
 
TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 1, 2007. 
 24. Report: U.N. Staffers Face Allegations of Rape, Sexual Abuse in Southern Sudan, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., Jan. 2, 2007. 
 25. Id. The Daily Telegraph of London published a report concerning the situation in Sudan. 
Holt & Hughes, supra note 23. The paper interviewed more than 20 victims in the city of Juba, and 
reported that hundreds more may have been abused since the UNMIS arrived in the region two years 
ago. See id.  
 26. Marian Houk, Commentary, Sexual Abuse of Children by U.N. Peacekeepers, MIDDLE E. 
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007. 
 27. Secretary-General Office of the Spokesperson, Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson 
for the Secretary-General on Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by U.N. Personnel in 
Sudan (Jan. 3, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2388.  
 28. Letter from Hillel C. Neuer, Executive Director of U.N. Watch, to Ban Ki-Moon, U.N. 
Secretary-General, and Louise Arbour, the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Jan. 3, 2007), 
available at http://unwatch.org/site/c.bolKKISNqEmG/b.1289203/apps/s/content.asp?ct=3394791. 
 29. Press Release, The Norwegian Nobel Comm., The Nobel Peace Prize 1988 (Sept. 30, 1988), 
available at http://nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/1988/press.html. In fact, U.N. peacekeepers, “[s]ince 
1945 have undertaken over sixty missions, negotiated 172 peaceful settlements . . . and enabled 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss2/2
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difficult and often perilous conditions, and many have lost their lives.30 
Nevertheless, the actions of some have cast a shadow over peacekeeping 
operations and indeed over the United Nations itself. Why does sexual 
exploitation and abuse in U.N. peacekeeping operations persist? Why, 
despite the harrowing revelations and specific recommendations for 
reform contained in many reports, have the U.N. and its Member States 
not taken effective action to address the situation? 
Peacekeeping forces are generally deployed to places where the social 
fabric has been torn apart by civil strife, where the rule of law is absent, 
where family structures have disintegrated, and where the local population 
endures severe economic and psychological hardship.31 Peacekeepers are 
viewed by the beneficiary population as wealthier than themselves and, as 
a result, peacekeepers can exercise enormous power over the local 
population. Under these conditions, power can be, and sometimes is, 
abused.  
It must also be recognized that the bulk of personnel in peacekeeping 
missions are men. As of December 2006, of the 8,482 U.N. police officers, 
only 454 were women, and of the 71,673 military personnel, only 1,034 
were women.32 A “hyper-masculine culture” exists that seems to 
encourage sexual exploitation and abuse.33 Such behavior has been 
dismissed in the past with a “boys will be boys” attitude, even by one U.N. 
official.34 Despite the announcement of the zero tolerance policy and 
increased education and training, the Under-Secretary of Peacekeeping 
 
 
citizens in more than forty-five countries to participate in free and fair elections.” United Nations 
Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, DPI/2429/Rev.1, May 2007. Further, an Oxford University survey found 
that this type of international military intervention is “the most cost-effective means of reducing the 
risk of conflict.” Id. 
 30. Id. In 2006, over 100 peacekeepers lost their lives. Secretary-General’s Message on 
International Day for United Nations Peacekeepers (May 29, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/dpko/peacekeepersday/2007/sgmessage.shtml. In response to their sacrifice, the U.N. created, 
per ST/SGB/200/15, the Dag Hammarskjöld Medal. Most recently, six peacekeepers were killed in 
Lebanon. Nada Bakri, 6 U.N. Peacekeepers Killed in Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2007, available 
at http://www.nytimes/2007/06/25/world/middleeast/25lebanon.html.  
 31. Anna Shotton, A Strategy to Address Sexual Exploitation by U.N. Peacekeeping Personnel, 
39 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 103 (2006).  
 32. U.N. YEAR REVIEW, supra 22, at 32. 
 33. MARTIN, supra note 19, at 5.  
 34. Profile: Bureaucrat at Large in the Balkans; Yasushi Akashi, Almost Painfully Diplomatic 
U.N. Envoy, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 30, 1994, at 14. In the early 1990s, U.N. peacekeepers in 
Cambodia were accused of sexually abusing girls; the top U.N. official in Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi, 
responded to the allegations by saying, “boys will be boys.” See generally Barbara Crossette, When 
Peacekeepers Turn Into Troublemakers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1996, § 4, at 6. The United Nations is 
often criticized for its cavalier attitude towards charges of sexual harassment lodged against United 
Nations personnel. 
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Operations acknowledged that not all troop contingents support the zero 
tolerance policy, particularly as it pertains to prostitution.35  
This masculine culture allows for a “wall of silence.” In traditionally 
male-dominated environments such as police departments, militaries, and 
fraternities, a bond forms that protects the members inside from outside 
accusations.36 Instances of abuse and exploitation may go unreported not 
only to protect the reputation of the peacekeepers, but also because the so-
called “whistle-blower” would be stigmatized. Thus, instances of sexual 
abuse are often ignored.37 
Further, the disciplinary rules for peacekeeping mission personnel vary 
according to the status of the individual involved.38 Each peacekeeping 
mission is composed of several different components including U.N. staff, 
experts, U.N. civilian police, U.N. military observers, members of national 
military contingents, and U.N. volunteers.39 U.N. personnel enjoy 
functional immunity from prosecution by the host state which can only be 
waived by the Secretary-General, while members of military contingents 
are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective TCC.40 Thus, 
discipline of offenders is uneven, and in many cases non-existent, thereby 
contributing to a culture of impunity.  
 
 
 35. Press Release, Security Council, Problem of Sexual Abuse by Peacekeepers Now Openly 
Recognized, Broad Strategy in Place to Address it, Security Council Told Head of Peacekeeping, 
Adviser to Secretary-General Brief, U.N. Doc. SC/8649 (Feb. 23, 2006). 
 36. See Eric Schmitt, Wall of Silence Impedes Inquiry into a Rowdy Navy Convention, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 14, 1992, at A1; see also Joan M. Dawson, Opinion, UN-believable: Sexual Misconduct 
by U.N. Peacekeepers (2006), available at http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:DS8SVzkECNAJ: 
english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp%3Fat_code%3D382507+OhMyNews+UN+peac
ekeeping+2006&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us. 
 37. See Dominic Hipkins, Bosnia Sex Trade Shames UN, SCOT. ON SUN., Feb. 9, 2003, available 
at http://www.scotsman.com/world/Bosnia-sex-trade-shames-UN.2400797.jp. Madeleine Rees, the 
former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in Bosnia, said that officials “don’t want to know 
about [sexual misconduct].” Id. She went on to say, “[t]here is this whole ‘boys will be boys’ attitude 
about men visiting brothels. There’s a culture inside the U.N. where you can’t criticize it. That goes all 
the way to the top.” Id. 
 38. Once a mission has been established by the Security Council, the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for planning, managing, deploying, and supporting 
the mission. In addition, DPKO has executive decision-making authority over peacekeeping 
operations, as delegated by the Secretary-General. Each peacekeeping mission is designed, planned, 
budgeted, and deployed based on the specific requirements of the situation it was created to address. 
Once a mission has been undertaken, DPKO acts as a liaison between the Security Council, troop and 
financial contributors, and parties to the conflict. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations Mission Statement, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/info/page3.htm (last visited Oct. 
22, 2007); see also Anthony J. Miller, Legal Aspects of Stopping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in 
U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 71 (2006).  
 39. See ZEID REPORT, supra note 3, at ¶ 14.  
 40. See infra Part VI.A–B.  
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IV. UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE 
In October 2000, as allegations of sexual abuse by U.N. peacekeepers 
became public, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 mandated that 
U.N. peacekeeping mission commanders take into account the differential 
impact of their actions on women and men.41 Recognizing the need to 
incorporate gender-oriented perspectives into peacekeeping operations, the 
Security Council urged Member States to increase support for gender-
sensitive training.42 It further asked that the Secretary-General take 
measures to expand the roles of women in field-based operations.43  
After additional reports of sexual abuse by U.N. peacekeepers surfaced 
in West Africa, the General Assembly requested that the Secretary-
General issue mandatory rules for all U.N. staff to explicitly prohibit 
sexual exploitation and abuse.44 The Secretary-General responded in 2003, 
defining sexual exploitation as “any actual or attempted abuse of a 
position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, 
including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically 
from the sexual exploitation of another.”45 Sexual abuse is defined as 
“actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by 
force or under unequal or coercive conditions.”46  
Implementation of the regulations and rules vary by mission, leading 
critics to charge that reform has been implemented piecemeal and far too 
slowly.47 Although gender-sensitivity training was initially proposed when 
the abuse was first documented, its implementation was flawed and more 
and more instances of exploitation have occurred.48  
Standards of conduct for military peacekeepers (i.e. military 
contractors of TCCs) are set out in two publications: Ten Rules: Code of 
Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets (Ten Rules) and We Are United 
 
 
 41. S.C. Res. 1325, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).  
 42. Id. ¶ 7. 
 43. Id. ¶ 16. 
 44. The Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection 
from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, § 2.2, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2003/13 (Oct. 9, 2003) 
[hereinafter 2003 Bulletin]; Investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West 
Africa, G.A. Res. 57/306, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/306 (May 22, 2003). 
 45. 2003 Bulletin, supra note 44, § 1.  
 46. Id.  
 47. See Warren Hoge, Report Finds U.N. Isn’t Moving to End Sex Abuse by Peacekeepers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at A5.  
 48. See SAVE THE CHILDREN UK, FROM CAMP TO COMMUNITY: LIBERIA STUDY ON 
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN (2006), available at http://www.savethechildren.it/2003/download/ 
pubblicazioni/Liberia/Liberia_sexual_exploitation_edited_LB.pdf (discussing recent sexual abuse in 
Liberia). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
194 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:185 
 
 
 
 
Nations Peacekeepers.49 Both publications regulate the conduct of 
peacekeepers in general terms and explicitly prohibit sexual exploitation.50 
Rule Four of Ten Rules requires that peacekeepers “. . . not indulge in 
immoral acts of sexual, physical or psychological abuse or exploitation of 
the local population or United Nations staff, especially women and 
children.”51 We Are United Nations Peacekeepers explicitly states that 
peacekeepers will never “[c]ommit any act that could result in physical, 
sexual or psychological harm or suffering to members of the local 
population, especially women and children.”52 However, it is the TCCs 
rather than the U.N. itself that are responsible for the conduct and 
discipline of their troops. 
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AND IMPLEMENTATION 
While some progress has been made and momentum for reform 
continues to build, much remains to be done and, indeed, the United 
Nations, several Member States, numerous NGOs, and the European 
Parliament indicate that there is continued reason for concern. 
Nevertheless, both the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
and the U.N. should be commended for the progress that they have made 
to date, particularly with respect to education and training programs and 
standardizing rules of conduct for U.N. personnel.  
Shortly after the issuance of the Zeid Report, the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations met to discuss its recommendations.53 The 
Committee adopted an ambitious two-year plan of action to effectively 
address the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse in U.N. 
peacekeeping operations.54 The Committee also requested that the 
 
 
 49. U.N. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, TEN RULES: CODE OF PERSONAL 
CONDUCT FOR BLUE HELMETS, available at http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/training/tespublications/ 
books/peacekeepingtraining/pocket_cards/ten_in.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2007) [hereinafter TEN 
RULES]; U.N. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS TRAINING UNIT, WE ARE UNITED 
NATIONS PEACEKEEPERS, available at http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/training/tespublications/books/ 
peacekeepingtraining/pocket_cards/un_in.pdf (last visited June 20, 2007) [hereinafter WE ARE 
PEACEKEEPERS].  
 50. Troop Contributing Countries recognize these as binding. ZEID REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 19. 
Troops, however, may think this policy is not binding. Id. ¶ 44. 
 51. TEN RULES, supra note 49. 
 52. WE ARE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPERS, supra note 49. 
 53. Press Release, Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations Begins Review of Report on Sexual Exploitation: Stressing Urgency, 
Determination to Address Problem, Department Head Outlines Measures Taken so Far, U.N. Doc. 
GA/PK/186 (Apr. 4, 2005) [hereinafter April 2005 Press Release]. 
 54. Id. 
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Secretary-General appoint a Group of Legal Experts to review and explore 
a framework that would ensure the accountability of United Nations staff 
and experts as well as members of military contingents on missions.55 
Among the critical areas that require action are the adoption of a plan 
to ensure the criminal accountability of U.N. staff and experts on mission, 
a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with each TCC 
incorporating the standards in the 2003 Bulletin in a legally effective 
manner, and a comprehensive policy on victim assistance.56  
A. Standardizing Norms of Conduct 
Perhaps the most significant progress has been made on identifying 
standardized norms of conduct for U.N. peacekeeping personnel. The 
basic and applicable standards of conduct for a U.N. peacekeeping 
operation derive from principles established in the U.N. Charter. These 
principles demand the highest standards of integrity from U.N. officials 
and are applicable to the civilian, military, and civilian police components 
of a U.N. peacekeeping operation.57  
Although initially only U.N. staff members were expressly bound by 
the prohibitions in the Secretary-General’s 2003 Bulletin, these standards 
have now been incorporated into the contracts, letters of engagement, and 
undertakings of all personnel.58 Further, U.N. staff regulations have been 
amended to clarify that sexual exploitation and abuse are considered to be 
 
 
 55. The Secretary-General, Ensuring the Accountability of United Nations Staff and Experts on 
Mission with Respect to Criminal Acts Committed in Peacekeeping Operations, delivered to the 
General Assembly, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/60/980 (Aug. 16, 2006) [hereinafter Ensuring Criminal 
Accountability of U.N. Staff and Experts on Mission]. 
 56. April 2005 Press Release, supra note 53. 
 57. U.N. Charter art. 101, ¶ 3; id. art. 105, ¶ 2. 
 58. GEN. ASSEMBLY, Special Comm. on Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group at the 2006 Substantive Session, ¶ 65, 
U.N. Doc. A/60/19 (Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Report of the Special Committee]. Today, U.N. 
volunteers, consultants, individual and corporate contractors, peacekeepers with the status of “experts 
on mission” (including police officers and military observers) are all bound by the standards of the 
bulletin. Secretary-General, Comprehensive Report Prepared Pursuant to General Assembly 
Resolution 59/296 on Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, Including Policy Development, 
Implementation and Full Justification of Proposed Capacity on Personnel Conduct Issues, ¶ 14, 
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/60/862 (May 24, 2006) [hereinafter Comprehensive 
Report]. Civilian police and military observers have the status and the privileges and immunities of 
experts on mission under the General Convention which governs the conditions under which the 
immunity may be waived by the Secretary-General. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the United Nations, Art. IV, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter General Convention]. 
Additionally, civilian police officers and military observers sign an “undertaking,” agreeing to abide 
by all U.N. procedures, policies, and directives. ZEID REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 18. 
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serious misconduct and may be grounds for disciplinary action, including 
dismissal.59 
However, standards of conduct for members of military contingents 
remain an area of concern. While TCCs have accepted the rules of conduct 
in the Ten Rules and We Are United Nations Peacekeepers documents, 
they are merely listed as guidelines, which might give rise to the inference 
that they are non-binding.60 Moreover, the expansive prohibitions of the 
Secretary-General’s 2003 Bulletin are not contained in the guidelines.61 As 
an initial step towards implementing the 2003 Bulletin standards for 
military contingents, a pre-deployment training module on preventing 
sexual abuse and exploitation with information on the 2003 Standards has 
been developed by the DPKO and is mandatory for all military and 
civilian personnel.62 However, it is not clear whether this tool has been 
implemented and whether it is effective.63 Since the issuance of the Zeid 
Report, 70%–90% of civilian police and military personnel have received 
some training on sexual abuse and exploitation.64 The number of reported 
allegations of sexual misconduct, however, continues to grow.65 
 
 
 59. The Secretary-General, The Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Staff Regulations, U.N. Doc. 
ST/SGB/2006/4 (Jan. 1, 2006).  
 60. April 2005 Press Release, supra note 53. 
 61. Miller, supra note 38. 
 62. Comprehensive Report, supra note 58, ¶ 15.  
 63. Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN 
PERSONS REPORT: STOPPING HUMAN TRAFFICKING, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, AND ABUSE BY 
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPERS 231, June 12, 2007 [hereinafter U.S. STATE DEP’T REPORT]. 
 64. Press Release, Security Council, Problem of Sexual Abuse by Peacekeepers now Openly 
Recognized, Broad Strategy in Place to Address it, Security Council Told, U.N. Doc. SC/8649 (Feb. 
23, 2006) [hereinafter Press Release, U.N. Doc. SC/8649]. Between September 2005 and April 2006, 
94% of all peacekeeping personnel deployed to Liberia were trained in Module 1: Prevention of sexual 
exploitation and abuse. Comprehensive Report, supra note 58, ¶ 15.  
 65. Between January 2005 and mid-May 2006, the United Nations investigated allegations of 
sexual exploitation by 307 peacekeepers. Id. ¶ 20. Sixteen civilians were dismissed and 155 uniformed 
peacekeepers were sent home as a result of the investigations. Id. See also General Assembly, 
Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission, U.N. Doc. A/62/329 
(Sept. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Criminal Accountability Note]. Between January and December 2006, “a 
total of 439 allegations of misconduct other than sexual exploitation and abuse were reported in 
missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.” Id. ¶ 8. During that same period, “357 
allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse were reported to the Office of Internal Oversight Services 
(OIOS). Of these allegations, 176 came from the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).” Id. ¶ 9. See also Francis Elliott & Ruth Elkins, U.N. 
Shame Over Sex Scandal, INDEP. Jan. 7, 2007 (reporting similar statistics). 
The increase in the number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse involving United 
Nations peacekeeping personnel over the past three years can in part be explained by such 
personnel and the host population becoming more aware of United Nations standards of 
conduct and developing greater confidence in the ability of the United Nations to receive 
complaints in a confidential setting and to take swift action. 
Comprehensive Report, supra note 58, ¶ 57.  
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B. Investigation and Discipline 
Investigation of sexual abuse and exploitation has been plagued with 
cumbersome procedural requirements and amateurism,66 and the 
investigation process continues to be an area of concern.67 Many have 
urged the Secretary-General to establish a permanent and independent 
investigative mechanism within the DPKO.68 In response, the DPKO has 
instituted Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDTs) on most missions to 
receive and assess sexual exploitation complaints. Serious offenses are 
referred to the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which is then 
responsible for investigating.69 However, the Secretary-General 
acknowledged that the OIOS does not have sufficient resources and that 
there is a backlog of serious misconduct cases yet to be investigated.70  
Other recommendations to improve investigation and enforcement 
include on-site courts-martial and using DNA and fingerprinting 
technology in the investigations.71 Although not widely adopted, on-site 
 
 
 66. ZEID REPORT, supra note 3, ¶¶ 28–29. 
 67. Comprehensive Report, supra note 58, ¶ 32. 
 68. See, e.g., ZEID REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 32. The investigative mechanism should report 
directly to the Secretary-General, have access to experts on sex crimes, evidentiary requirements, and 
standards of proof, and be used to investigate all types of peacekeeping personnel. Id. This new 
mechanism should replace the preliminary investigation and board of inquiry, which are duplicative 
and ineffectual, and the reliance on “enthusiastic amateurs” to conduct investigations. Id. It should 
have the authority to act in the mission area, and the mission authorities should be required to 
cooperate with investigators. Id. A TCC should be required to participate in any investigation of its 
own personnel, ensuring that evidence is gathered in accordance with the laws of the TCC so that it 
could be later used in criminal proceedings inside the TCC. Id. ¶ 33. 
 As of May 2006, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations “began training mission staff . . . on 
a web-based mechanism . . . to store[] reported allegations of misconduct.” Comprehensive Report, 
supra note 58, ¶ 21. Once operational, this program would “ensure that prior offenders are not 
rehired.” Id. 
 69. Comprehensive Report, supra note 58, ¶ 20; U.S. STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 63, at 
231.  
 70. Comprehensive Report, supra note 58, ¶ 32. Pursuant to resolution 59/287, the DPKO 
transferred investigations of sexual exploitation and abuse to the OIOS, which lacks sufficient 
resources for the task. Id. The Secretary-General has urged the TCCs to complement the OIOS’s 
efforts pursuant to resolution 59/287. Id.  
 71. ZEID REPORT, supra note 3, ¶¶ 31, 35. For an analysis of the use of DNA, see Ashley R. 
Melson, Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and Biotechnology in the Military: A Comparative Analysis of 
Legal and Ethical Issues in the Research, Development, and Use of Biotechnological Products on 
American and British Soldiers, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 497, 506 (2004). The author notes that 
sharing of biotechnology among allies in war can have detrimental consequences. Id. For example, 
collecting and storing DNA samples to determine soldiers’ genetic makeup may maximize troop 
potential, but may also be harmful to the soldier if the information were divulged by the military. Id. 
For instance, if countries are allies, both the soldier’s country and any allied countries could access 
detailed private information. Id. 
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courts-martial have been employed by at least two TCCs.72 Proposals for 
DNA and fingerprinting technology, however, have not been 
implemented, due in part to a scarcity of resources.73 
C. Community Outreach and Conditions of Missions 
In addition to intensive training, Prince Zeid’s recommendations 
focused on community outreach, including explaining the U.N.’s policy 
against sexual exploitation and abuse and providing effective mechanisms 
for individuals to lodge complaints against U.N. personnel in a 
confidential setting.74 The recently established CDTs are charged with 
implementing these duties.75 Other recommendations focused on actions 
that might be taken within peacekeeping missions themselves, with the 
specific conditions of the mission in mind, to reduce the likelihood of 
sexual abuse and exploitation. As a result, where there have been 
allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation, some missions have instituted 
preventive measures such as telephone hotlines, off-limits areas, and the 
requirement that uniforms be worn at all times.76 
Military contingents often serve under conditions of severe hardship. 
To facilitate the compliance of peacekeepers with the U.N.’s zero-
tolerance policy, recommendations were made for regular periods of rest 
and relaxation away from mission areas, visits with family members, and 
access to welfare officers and staff counselors.77 Presently, a welfare 
allocation of $8 per month per soldier is paid by the U.N. to each TCC, but 
these funds are frequently not spent for their intended purpose.78 A 
comprehensive strategy on welfare and recreation reform is under 
consideration. At the very least, the policy should require that the welfare 
allocation be used for the welfare of contingent members on the ground, 
for example, to establish fixed recreational sites inside or near the mission 
area.79  
 
 
 72. Press Release, U.N. Doc. SC/8649, supra note 64.  
 73. Id. 
 74. ZEID REPORT, supra note 3, ¶¶ 40–41. Each mission should implement a data collection and 
management system in order to track allegations and the mission’s response to the allegations (for 
example, status of investigations and full-time personnel conduct officers should be installed at 
headquarters and in missions in order to implement these measures). Id. ¶ 41. 
 75. U.S. STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 63, at 231. 
 76. Id.  
 77. ZEID REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 51. 
 78. Id. Prince Zeid further recommended that each mission provide emergency and practical 
assistance to victims who make allegations against U.N. peacekeeping personnel. Id. ¶ 52. 
 79. Id. ¶ 51. As of May 2006, several missions had established recreational facilities. 
Comprehensive Report, supra note 58, ¶ 16. For example, the mission in the Congo had a reporting 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss2/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] AN END TO IMPUNITY 199 
 
 
 
 
While many of these recommendations have been implemented in 
some missions, reform is by no means uniform or even widespread. 
D. Increase of Female Participation in Peacekeeping Missions 
All proposals for reforming peacekeeping operations recognize the 
need for more female peacekeepers, especially at senior levels.80 A higher 
percentage of female peacekeepers is necessary to facilitate an 
environment that discourages sexual exploitation and abuse.81 Although 
the number of female peacekeepers has increased in recent years, the 
number remains unacceptably low. The DPKO has attempted to remedy 
this disparity and convened a policy dialogue with fifty-five TCCs in 
March 2006, at which Member States were asked to double the number of 
female peacekeepers within the next few years.82 In an innovative 
program, India deployed an all-women team of U.N. peacekeepers in 
Liberia and the U.N. sponsored a conference of gender experts to discuss 
ways to encourage more female participation.83 One U.N. official “noted 
that there are certain specific responsibilities that women in most cases 
perform better than male officers, namely sexual assault cases and in some 
instances child abuse cases where the victims—mostly female, feel more 
at ease, culturally and emotionally, dealing with a female officer.”84  
 
 
and evacuation center which doubles as a recreational center. Id. To maintain morale, a TCC in 
Burundi “provides its soldiers with free satellite television and telephone facilities and offers spiritual 
guidance and counseling.” Id. See also U.S. STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 63, at 232. 
 80. ZEID REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 43; PeaceWomen.org, U.N. Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) 2007 Session General Debate: Feb. 26–27, 2007, http://www. 
peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/Events/C34/2007/sessionindex.html.  
 81. ZEID REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 43. 
 82. U.N. YEAR REVIEW, supra note 22, at 18. Although women make up almost thirty percent of 
civilian staff and have headed peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, and 
Georgia, women remain a minority of military personnel. Id. In March 2006, the DPKO met with fifty-
five TCCs and agreed that steps must be taken to correct this deficit. Id. The DPKO’s long-term goal is 
for ten percent female representation. Id. Additionally, TCCs were asked to double the number of 
female uniformed peacekeepers every year. Id. To date, Nigeria has supplied forty-nine female police 
officers, followed by India and Bangladesh both contributing thirty-four, and the U.S. contributing 
twenty-four female police officers. Id. Early in 2007, Nigeria was expected to deploy an all-women 
police contingent in Darfur and India sent a similar contingent to Liberia last year. Id. at 19.  
 83. Female Peacekeepers Reach Liberia: The First All-Female Unit of the United Nations has 
Arrived in Liberia’s Capital, Monrovia, BBC NEWS, Jan. 30, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/Africa/6314263.stm.  
 84. U.N. Police Workshop in Italy is Latest Effort to Attract More Female Officers Into the 
Force, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, Mar. 17, 2007, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21905& 
Cr=police&Cr1. 
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VI. PROPOSALS REQUIRING URGENT ACTION 
A. Accountability of U.N. Staff and Experts on Missions 
In August 2006, the Group of Legal Experts appointed by the 
Secretary-General to examine and report on accountability of U.N. staff 
and experts on mission issued its report.85 Its recommendations were 
designed to ensure that such personnel would be held responsible in all 
instances for criminal acts in accordance with established principles of due 
process.86 The Group of Legal Experts also made recommendations for 
improving administrative investigations.87  
Under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations, U.N. personnel are immune from criminal prosecution by 
national authorities for acts performed in the course of their official duties 
unless such immunity is waived by the Secretary-General.88 Through 
various agreements, this immunity extends to civilian police, military 
observers, and volunteers. Where a Host State’s legal system is 
dysfunctional, the Secretary-General is unlikely to waive a peacekeeper’s 
immunity from criminal prosecution.89 The Group of Legal Experts 
recommended a new international convention,90 which would not 
undermine the immunity of the U.N. but would “create conditions which 
make it easier for any applicable immunity to be waived.”91 
The Group of Legal Experts first recommended that the Host State be 
given priority in exercising jurisdiction since, in most instances, witnesses 
and evidence are more accessible locally.92 In addition, the Group of Legal 
 
 
 85. See Ensuring Criminal Accountability of U.N. Staff and Experts on Mission, supra note 55. 
 86. Id. at Note by the Secretary-General. 
 87. Id. ¶¶ 81–84. 
 88. General Convention, supra note 58, §§ 11, 14, 18–20, 22, 23. In practice, the discretion to 
waive immunity is delegated to Legal Counsel. ZEID REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ A.3. 
 89. Ensuring Criminal Accountability of U.N. Staff and Experts on Mission, supra note 55, ¶ 22. 
 90. Id. at Annex III. A draft text of an international Convention, included in Ensuring Criminal 
Accountability of U.N. Staff and Experts on Mission, is modeled after the numerous treaties dealing 
with terrorism. Id.  
 91. Id. ¶ 68. 
 92. Id. ¶ 27. The Host State’s exercise of jurisdiction is preferable for a variety of reasons, 
including:  
(a) The host State is the State on whose territory the crime was committed. . . . 
(b) The host State is likely to be the place where most of the witnesses and evidence are 
located. . . . 
. . . . 
(d) Holding trials in the host State will give the local population a greater sense of justice. . . . 
This is important in demonstrating the commitment of the United Nations to the rule of law. 
Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss2/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] AN END TO IMPUNITY 201 
 
 
 
 
Experts reported that holding trials in the Host State would “give the local 
population a greater sense of justice being done and being seen as being 
done.”93 In order to facilitate such jurisdiction, the capacity of the 
investigatory, prosecutorial, adjudicatory, and custodial institutions of the 
Host State should be built up to “enable the host State to exercise 
jurisdiction over all persons, including peacekeeping personnel, in 
accordance with international standards for human rights and due 
process.”94 The proposed Convention provides that jurisdiction could also 
be exercised by the state of the alleged offender’s nationality if the 
conduct constitutes a crime in both the Host State and the state of 
nationality of the offender,95 the state where the offender is found if it will 
not extradite,96 or the state of habitual residence for a stateless offender.97 
The Group of Legal Experts also explored the feasibility of jurisdiction in 
an international court or tribunal, “such as the International Criminal Court 
[(ICC)] or . . . a new judicial institution,” but acknowledged the 
conceptual and practical difficulties with such a proposal.98 The main 
obstacle is that international tribunals typically exercise jurisdiction only 
over conduct that constitutes the most serious crimes “in international law, 
including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”99 Rape and 
solicitation of a prostitute, although serious offenses, would not likely fall 
within an international tribunal’s jurisdiction, unless they were committed 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack in furtherance of a state 
 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. ¶ 38. See also id. ¶ 39 (discussing obstacles to “capacity-building”). 
 95. Id. ¶ 59. A panel of legal experts met in 2006 to make recommendations on how standards 
contained in the 2003 Bulletin could bind TCCs in the period prior to the conclusion of a MOU and 
how to standardize norms of conduct so that they are applicable to all categories of peacekeepers. The 
Secretary-General, Making the Standards Contained in the Secretary-General’s Bulletin Binding on 
Contingent Members and Standardizing the Norms of Conduct so that They are Applicable to All 
Categories of Peacekeeping Personnel, ¶ 16, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/61/645 
(Dec. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Making the Secretary-General’s Bulletin Standards Binding on 
Contingent Members]. 
 96. Ensuring Criminal Accountability of U.N. Staff and Experts on Mission, supra note 55, ¶ 59. 
The exercise of jurisdiction of the state where an alleged offender is found is controversial because 
such exercise would be based on Universal Jurisdiction, which is normally reserved for more serious 
and widespread crimes against humanity. Id. ¶¶ 53–58. 
 97. Id. ¶ 60. The Group of Legal Experts later made recommendations on how investigations 
should be conducted that reflected awareness of not only investigational requirements for U.N. 
disciplinary action, but the evidentiary and procedural laws of the prosecuting States that make 
criminal proceedings possible. Id. ¶ 84. 
 98. Id. ¶ 70. See also id. ¶¶ 69, 71 (discussing prosecution in an international tribunal). For 
example, a hybrid tribunal could only be created with the consent of the Host State and is resource 
intensive. Id. ¶¶ 73, 71(b). 
 99. Id. ¶ 71(a). See generally id. ¶¶ 71–75. 
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policy.100 Further, not all states have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC 
and the creation of a new tribunal via a Security Council resolution is 
unlikely.101 
The draft Convention102 is problematic in several respects. A United 
Nations official or expert on mission commits a crime within the meaning 
of the draft Convention if he engages in “[r]ape and acts of sexual 
violence” or “[s]exual offenses involving children.”103 The act of offering 
food or money to an adult woman in exchange for sex does not appear to 
be a crime under the proposed Convention although such an act does 
violate the standards contained in the 2003 Bulletin. While some states do 
not criminalize so-called voluntary prostitution, prostitution in the 
peacekeeping context involves an imbalance of power and is inherently 
coercive. Peacekeepers occupy a position of trust in the Host State. Thus, 
prostitution in any form exploits the vulnerability and extreme poverty of 
the very population that the peacekeepers are sent to protect, thereby 
exacerbating the emotional trauma already inflicted on the members of the 
local community. Often a woman or girl trades the only material asset she 
has, her body, as a means of survival.104  
While it is unclear whether excluding the solicitation of prostitutes 
from the list of crimes was intentional or an oversight, the drafters offered 
as an alternate definition of the crimes: “[c]rimes of intentional violence 
against the person and sexual offences punishable under the national law 
of that State party by imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty for a 
maximum period of at least [one/two] years(s), or by a more severe 
penalty.”105  
The draft Convention was discussed by the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on 
Mission (Ad Hoc Committee) at a week-long meeting in April 2007.106 
 
 
 100. See id. ¶ 71(e); U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15–July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9*. 
 101. Ensuring Criminal Accountability of U.N. Staff and Experts on Mission, supra note 55, 
¶ 71(d). 
 102. The draft Convention was adapted from the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Id. at n.21. (citing G.A. Res. 59/290, annex, art. 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/59/290 (Apr. 15, 2005)). 
 103. Ensuring Criminal Accountability of U.N. Staff and Experts on Mission, supra note 55, 
Annex III, art. 3.  
 104. Shotton, supra note 31, at 102. 
 105. Ensuring Criminal Accountability of U.N. Staff and Experts on Mission, supra note 55, 
Annex III, art. 3. 
 106. General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on Criminal Accountability of United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Criminal Accountability of U.N. 
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Questions were raised concerning quasi-universal jurisdiction and the 
extradition or prosecution regime proposed in the Convention.107 
Questions were also raised concerning the scope of the Convention both as 
to the crimes (ratione materiae)108 and the personnel (ratione personae) 
that would be subject to the Convention.109 It was suggested by numerous 
delegations that, given the elaborate process and resources necessary to 
conclude an international Convention, the Convention might be expanded 
to include other operations and categories of personnel such as those 
participating in United Nations operations in the field and staff of 
specialized agencies.110 Other delegations expressed the view that the 
proposed Convention should “apply to other crimes such as theft . . . , 
money-laundering and torture,” while some delegations questioned the 
need for a Convention at this time.111 The Ad Hoc Committee concluded 
that discussion on precise terms of the Convention was premature and 
should be delayed until a later stage.112  
On September 11, 2007, the U.N. Secretariat issued a Note supporting 
a new international Convention as proposed by the Group of Legal Experts 
and incorporating the comments of the Ad Hoc Committee on expanding 
the scope of the Convention as it applied both to personnel and to 
crimes.113 The U.N. Secretariat proposed that the Convention should apply 
to all personnel of U.N. operations, including contractors and consultants, 
 
 
Officials and Experts on Mission, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/62/54 (Apr. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Report of the Ad 
Hoc Committee].  
 107. Id. ¶ 25. For example, the Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand delegation conceded that 
quasi-jurisdiction over such crimes would be inappropriate. New Zealand Permanent Mission to the 
United Nations, Ad Hoc Committee on criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts 
on mission, Statement by Mr. Scott Sherran (Apr. 9, 2007), available at http://www.nzembassy.com/ 
home.cfm?c=51 (follow New Zealand’s UN statements; then follow 9 April 2007—Criminal 
Accountability of UN officials and Experts). In some areas it would be too broad, whereas in other 
areas it would be too narrow. Id. “One such question would be whether the Convention should cover 
not just civilian staff of peacekeeping missions, but also civilian staff in other U.N. operations, for 
example, those established for the purpose of delivering humanitarian, political or developmental 
assistance.” Id.  
 108. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 106, ¶¶ 18–21. 
 109. Id. ¶¶ 22–24. 
 110. Id. ¶ 19. 
 111. Id. ¶ 22. Recently, the BBC reported that Pakistani peacekeeping troops traded gold and sold 
weapons to the very people they were meant to disarm. Martin Plaut, U.N. Troops “Traded Gold for 
Guns”, BBC NEWS, May 23, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6681457.stm. 
 112. Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Ambassador Ileana Nunez Mordoche, 
Deputy Permanent Representative of Cuba, on Behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, on the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission, Apr. 9, 
2007, available at http://www.cubaminrex.cu/English/currentissues/2007/Abril/statement-Ambassador 
-Ileana.htm.  
 113. Criminal Accountability Note, supra note 65. 
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not just to personnel engaged in peacekeeping operations,114 and 
reaffirmed that military members of national contingents “are subject to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the sending State.”115 
The new Convention would not be limited to crimes against the person 
or crimes involving sexual exploitation and abuse, but would be 
comprehensive enough to include crimes such as gold smuggling or 
trafficking in weapons, which have also been alleged in recent 
peacekeeping operations.116 
The Note recommended that the Convention not “list the crimes to be 
covered, nor specify how crimes should be defined.”117 Instead, the 
Secretariat drew on prior model Conventions as precedent to describe 
crimes covered by a Convention and endorsed the alternate definition of 
crimes contained in the Report of the Group of Legal Experts.118 Thus, the 
Convention would cover crimes, “as they are known and defined under the 
national law of the State asserting jurisdiction and that are punishable 
under that nation’s law by at least two/three years’ imprisonment.”119 
While it is desirable that a new international Convention cover not only 
crimes of sexual abuse and exploitation, the definition of crimes raises 
serious issues for implementing the U.N.’s zero tolerance policy. Under 
both the Report of the Group of Legal Experts and the Note of the 
Secretariat, the criminal nature of an act would depend upon the domestic 
law of the state exercising jurisdiction. Soliciting a prostitute could be 
considered a crime only if punishable by imprisonment or another severe 
penalty in the state exercising jurisdiction. Since so-called voluntary 
prostitution is not criminalized in all states, the same conduct by U.N. 
officials and experts on mission may or may not be criminal depending 
upon which state exercises jurisdiction.  
The Secretary-General reported that:  
In 2005, nearly half of all sexual exploitation and abuse allegations 
made against United Nations peacekeeping personnel involved 
prostitution or transactions of a similar nature where money, goods 
 
 
 114. The Report of Legal Experts, which discussed accountability in terms solely of peacekeeping 
operations, was limited by its terms of reference. See generally Ensuring Criminal Accountability of 
U.N. Staff and Experts on Mission, supra note 55.  
 115. Criminal Accountability Note, supra note 65, at 2. 
 116. Id. ¶ 37.  
 117. Id. ¶ 39. 
 118. Id. ¶ 40. 
 119. Id. The Note cites as precedent for so defining the applicable crimes the United Nations 
Model Treaty on Extradition. Id. ¶ 40. Article 2 of the Model Treaty defines extraditable offenses as 
those crimes punishable by a minimum sentence of imprisonment of one to two years. Id.  
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or services were exchanged for sexual favours. Adherence to the 
United Nations prohibition on engagement in prostitution among 
both civilians and uniformed personnel would therefore bring the 
United Nations considerably closer towards full implementation of 
my zero-tolerance policy of sexual exploitation and abuse.120  
It is therefore clear that in order to implement the zero-tolerance policy, 
prostitution must be prohibited in all instances. The new international 
Convention should explicitly criminalize prostitution in the peacekeeping 
context because of its inherently coercive character. Thus, a state that 
signs a treaty criminalizing prostitution in peacekeeping operations is 
deemed to have recognized the inherently coercive nature of peacekeeper 
prostitution and distinguished it from so-called voluntary prostitution, 
which may be legal under the state’s domestic law.  
While an international Convention is an important step in ensuring the 
accountability of U.N. related personnel, such a Convention will take time 
to come into force. This is particularly relevant since the Note of the 
Secretariat proposes expanding the scope of the Convention both as to the 
crimes and personnel covered. Moreover, it can only be implemented with 
the consent of the Member States. Finally, given various delegations’ 
concerns about the necessity of the Convention and the need to coordinate 
with various other U.N. committees, there is little likelihood that the 
Convention will enter into force in the near future.121 
B. Revised Memorandum of Understanding with Troop Contributing 
Countries  
Although each peacekeeping mission is composed of both civilian and 
military personnel, recently peacekeeping missions have been 
overwhelmingly composed of military personnel.122 Since the United 
Nations does not have any military of its own, it relies on a relatively 
small number of countries, mainly developing countries,123 to contribute 
 
 
 120. Comprehensive Report, supra note 58, ¶ 35. “To that end, the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations is planning to launch two campaigns in the 2006–07 period: an anti-prostitution campaign 
and another emphasizing peacekeepers’ duty of care to the host population.” Id.  
 121. Ensuring Criminal Accountability of U.N. Staff and Experts on Mission, supra note 55, ¶ 64. 
Recognizing that a new Convention would take time to implement, the Group of Legal Experts also 
suggested steps that the General Assembly could take to ensure accountability in the interim. Id. ¶ 65. 
 122. U.N. Dep’t of Public Information, Peace and Security, U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: 
Background Note, U.N. Doc. No. DPI/1634/Rev.65 (Oct. 31, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote010101.pdf. 
 123. As of April 30, 2007, the ten countries contributing the greatest number of troops are 
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military personnel and civilian police to staff its many peacekeeping and 
peace building operations.124 Once a Member State agrees to provide 
troops, the TCC and the United Nations enter into a MOU that 
“establish[es] the administrative, logistical and financial terms and 
conditions to govern the contribution of personnel, equipment and services 
provided by the Government in support of [a particular U.N.] 
peacekeeping mission.”125  
Under the Status of Forces Agreement, which the U.N. and the Host 
State negotiate, each TCC retains exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute and 
otherwise discipline its military personnel.126 This immunity cannot be 
waived by the Secretary-General since jurisdiction is exclusive to the 
TCC.127 TCCs are united in their insistence that military personnel should 
not be subject to disciplinary action by the United Nations or by any other 
state, including the Host State.128 Unfortunately, however, TCCs have a 
 
 
Bangladesh, France, Ghana, India, Italy, Jordan, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Uruguay. U.N. DEP’T 
OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, PEACE AND SECURITY, Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and 
Civilian Police Personnel (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2007/ 
apr07_2.pdf. 
 124. U.N. Dep’t of Public Information, International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers, U.N. 
Doc. DPI/2311 (May 29, 2003), http://www.un.org/events/peacekeepers/2003/docs/qanda.htm. For 
each military personnel deployed, the U.N. pays the TCC $1,000 per troop per month. Id. For some 
TCCs, this is a significant source of income. See U.N. DEP’T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, PEACE AND 
SECURITY, Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Civilian Police Personnel (Apr. 30, 
2007), http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2007/apr07_2.pdf. Unlike financial support 
for peacekeeping, which is mandatory for Member States, the contribution of personnel (soldiers, 
military observers, civilian police), equipment, supplies or other support for peacekeeping operations 
is entirely voluntary. Id. Member States who do contribute essential elements are reimbursed from the 
mission budget at agreed-upon rates. 
 125. See U.N. General Assembly, Revised Draft Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
United Nations and [Participating State] Contributing Resources to [the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operation], U.N. Doc. A/61/494, 4 (Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Secretary-General’s Revised MOU]. 
 126. Criminal Accountability Note, supra note 65, at 2. Indeed, no country has been willing to 
subject its military contingents to the jurisdiction of a foreign nation. The U.S. has been at the 
forefront of this resistance to any international criminal tribunal, such as the ICC, complaining about 
the lack of procedural safeguards and checks on the authority of the ICC. See John Washburn, 
Assessments of the United States Position: The International Criminal Court Arrives – The U.S. 
Position: Status and Prospects, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 873, 873–874 (2002); Anthony Arnold, Trial 
by Fire: The International Criminal Court Pushes Ahead, HARV. INT’L REV., Winter 2003, at 11, 
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2003/0201trial.htm.  
 127. The Secretary-General, Model Status-of Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations, ¶ 
41, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/45/594, Annex (Oct. 9, 1990). See also ZEID 
REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 78. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations made its 
recommendations without challenging the right of a TCC to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its 
own contingents. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 58, ¶ 72. 
 128. For example, in discussing the Convention on accountability of U.N. personnel, Sudan, 
speaking for the African group, emphasized that military personnel should remain under the 
jurisdiction of the TCC. Statement by Mr. Yasir Abdelsalam Permanent mission of the Republic of 
Sudan to the United Nations: Before the Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Criminal 
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poor record of holding their personnel accountable for such violations.129 
Often the perpetrators are sent home and no further action is taken by the 
home country, making it impossible for victims to determine what, if any, 
punishment was imposed.130 Although the Model Status of Forces 
Agreement requires the Secretary-General to “obtain formal assurances 
from a TCC that it would exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes [or 
offenses] committed . . . in the mission area,”131 in practice these 
assurances have not been requested.132  
A revised MOU that would incorporate the standards contained in the 
Secretary-General’s 2003 Bulletin133 in a legally effective way within the 
legal system of the TCC has been urged by the U.N., NGOs, and some 
governments, including that of the United States.134  
While negotiations concerning the adoption of a revised MOU 
continue, the Group of Legal Experts recommended that as an interim 
measure, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations state in a note 
verbale to TCCs that the contribution of national contingents is made with 
the understanding that the TCC take steps to ensure to investigate and 
punish substantiated allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation as set 
forth in the 2003 Bulletin.135  
 
 
Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission, Apr. 9, 2007. This written 
statement, distributed at the Ad Hoc Committee, is in the author’s possession. 
 129. On March 1, 2005, Kim R. Holmes, Assistant Secretary for International Organization 
Affairs, criticized the U.N. and DPKO for failing to “create a culture that rejects and penalizes 
exploitation and abuse at every level of peacekeeping.” See Kim R. Holmes, Statement on United 
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and Peacekeeping 
Reform before House of Representatives International Relations Committee (Mar. 1, 2005), available 
at http:/www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/42982.htm. 
 130. See Vanessa L. Kent, Peacekeepers as Perpetrators of Abuse, 14 AFR. SEC. REV. 85, 87, 89 
(2005), available at http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/ASR/14No2/EKent.pdf. Even in cases in which the 
U.N. has repatriated military peacekeepers, “crimes are often ignored and rarely punished: absentee 
fathers, rapists and murderers simply disappear back in their own countries.” Id. at 85. 
 131. ZEID REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 78. 
 132. Id. at A.27. The Model Status of Forces Agreement envisaged that the provision regarding 
the Secretary-General obtaining assurances from the governments of participating states “would be 
inserted into the memorandums of understanding, however, no such provision is included in the model 
memorandum of understanding . . . although it was in some early memorandums of understanding 
. . . .” 
 133. Making the Secretary-General’s Bulletin Standards Binding on Contingent Members, supra 
note 95, ¶ 4. Since the adoption of a new MOU requires extensive negotiations with the TCCs and 
would require time to implement, the Group of Legal Experts also made recommendations for binding 
military contingents to the standards set out in the 2003 Bulletin before a revised Memorandum of 
Understanding could be drafted and adopted. The Group’s recommendations for ensuring compliance 
with the standards set out in the 2003 Bulletin by military contingents are meant to be temporary, and 
would not prevent sexual exploitation as effectively as an actual treaty. 
 134. U.S. STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 63.  
 135. Making the Secretary-General’s Bulletin Standards Binding on Contingent Members, supra 
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A new MOU is crucial to the realization of the zero tolerance policy 
since the vast majority of allegations of sexual abuse have been leveled 
against members of military contingents. After consultation with the 
Member States, the Secretary-General issued a revised draft model MOU 
on October 3, 2006.136 It specifically affirms the long-standing policy that 
military members of national contingents are subject to the TCC’s 
exclusive jurisdiction.137 However, exclusive jurisdiction is based on the 
understanding that the TCC will, in fact, exercise jurisdiction with respect 
to crimes and offences committed by the TCC’s national contingent.138 
The revised MOU incorporates the U.N. standards of conduct, the Ten 
Rules, We Are United Nations Peacekeepers, and the prohibitions on 
sexual exploitation and abuse contained in the 2003 Bulletin.139 It requires 
the TCC to issue the U.N. standards as binding standards under the laws or 
disciplinary code of its contingent’s members.140 While not referring to 
prostitution specifically, by incorporating the language in the 2003 
Bulletin, frequenting prostitutes would be prohibited conduct. 
The revised MOU requires the TCC to vest each commander of a 
contingent with the authority necessary to ensure compliance with U.N. 
standards of conduct, mission standards, and local laws and regulations, 
and to report all discipline to the U.N. Force Commander.141 Additionally, 
the TCC must cooperate with any U.N. investigation and share necessary 
information.142 The U.N. may repatriate a national contingent commander 
who has failed to exercise effective command.143 The TCC may then 
 
 
note 95, ¶¶ 12–15. 
 136. Secretary-General’s Revised MOU, supra note 125.  
 137. Id. at 7–8. If the TCC suspects a member of its national contingent has committed such 
misconduct, it will inform the U.N. and forward the allegations to the appropriate authorities. If the 
investigation of an alleged crime, conducted either by the U.N. or the TCC, is well-founded, the TCC 
must forward the case to its appropriate authorities, submit progress reports to the Secretary-General, 
and, ultimately, inform the Secretary-General of the outcome of the case. Id. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at Annex H. Added to the purpose of the MOU is the following language: “and to provide 
for the maintenance of discipline and good order among such personnel and the investigation of, and 
accountability for, violations.” Id. art. 3.  
 140. Id. at Annex H. In order to ensure compliance, the MOU requires that the contingent’s 
members receive pre-deployment training regarding these U.N. standards.  
 141. Id. Although the MOU vests ultimate authority (and responsibility) with the commander of 
the contingent, the MOU falls short of imposing financial burdens on the commander as proposed in 
the Zeid Report. The Zeid Report suggests that the troop-contributing country take disciplinary action 
against contingent commanders who are removed due to noncompliance. ZEID REPORT, supra note 3, 
¶ 61. Further, the Zeid Report suggests that the U.N. recover all payments made to the commander and 
that these monies be paid to the trust fund for victims. Id. Additionally, it does not adopt the Report’s 
elaborate letter commendation recommendations.  
 142. Id. at Annex H. 
 143. Id.  
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prosecute or take disciplinary action against such national contingent 
commander.144  
With respect to financial accountability, all child-support claims would 
be forwarded by the TCC to its appropriate national authorities.145 If these 
claims are accompanied by credible evidence of paternity, the TCC must 
assist the claimant in filing and pursuing her claim before the national 
authorities.146 
While the revised MOU incorporates the 2003 standards, it is subject to 
negotiation and must be adopted by each TCC. The Under-Secretary 
General for Peacekeeping Operations acknowledged that discipline in the 
field must be improved but indicated that some states opposed the 
introduction of such standards in a revised MOU.147 He called on those 
unnamed countries to rethink their position.148  
Since prosecution for violations of the standards will continue to rest 
with the TCC, unless adequate sanctions for failure to prosecute are 
implemented, such as withdrawal of contingents or disqualification from 
participation in peacekeeping operations, the revised MOU will not 
achieve its goal of making the standards legally binding on members of 
military contingents. Indeed the mantra, that it is the responsibility of the 
Member State—not the U.N.—to discipline members of military 
contingents, will continue.149 Despite repeated urging by NGOs and 
Member States, including the United States, no action has been taken on 
the revised MOU.150 
 
 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. art. 7(2) septiens.  
 146. Id. art. 7(3) septiens. 
 147. See U.N. Peacekeepers Need Formal Discipline, United Press Int’l, May 30, 2007, available 
at http://www.upi.com/International_Intelligence/Briefing/2007/05/30/un_peacekeepers_need_formal_ 
discipline/1507.  
 148. Id.  
 149. In response to this accountability deficit, the U.S. Congress threatened to cut funds to the 
U.N. in the absence of a revised MOU. Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2745, 
109th Cong. (2005). The proposed bill, in the end, failed to pass Congress.  
 150. PeaceWomen.org, U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) 2007 Session 
General Debate; Feb. 26–27, 2007, http://www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/Events/C34/2007/ 
sessionindex.html. In commenting on the revised MOU, Prince Zeid noted that, “[a] revised 
memorandum of understanding could reduce significantly the number of cases of sexual exploitation 
and abuse, and would provide greater justice to victims.” Press Release, General Assembly, Special 
Committee Continues Consideration of Measures Aimed at Sexual Exploitation by Peacekeepers: 
Revised Model Memorandum of Understanding, Draft Victim Assistance Strategy Discussed, U.N. 
Doc. GA/PK/190 (July 27, 2006) [hereinafter July 2006 Press Release].  
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C. Victim Assistance Policy  
Although there is general agreement on the urgent need for a strategy 
of assistance to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse, currently no clear 
system is in place. Thus, “[i]t is likely that there are victims of sexual 
exploitation and abuse by United Nations staff or related personnel in 
almost all countries where the United Nations has a presence.”151 In May 
2006, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly a draft of 
a U.N. policy statement on strategy for assisting and supporting victims 
who were sexually exploited and abused by United Nations staff or related 
personnel.152 This Draft Victim Assistance Policy, now pending before the 
General Assembly, requires that the U.N. provide assistance and support 
to compensate victims and children born as a result of sexual abuse and 
exploitation by U.N. staff or related personnel.153 Financial and technical 
support include medical services, legal services, immediate basic material 
care, emergency shelter, educational opportunities, and expanded 
psychosocial services to assist victims and raise awareness within the local 
communities.154  
While insisting that the U.N. bears no legal liability for sexual 
misconduct of U.N. peacekeepers, the Draft Victim Assistance Policy 
recommends that a funding mechanism be established by the United 
Nations to fund such assistance through a centralized “Headquarters-based 
trust fund.”155 Contributions would be made by “departments, agencies, 
funds and programmes” within the United Nations and, also, by TCCs.156 
The categories of persons to receive help include complainants, victims, 
and “children born as a result of sexual exploitation and abuse by [U.N.] 
staff or related personnel.”157 An international group probing the scandal 
in Congo found that “at least 82 women and girls had been made pregnant 
 
 
 151. The Secretary-General, Draft United Nations Policy Statement and Draft Comprehensive 
Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations 
Staff or Related Personnel, Annex ¶ 2, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/60/877 (June 
5, 2006) [hereinafter Victim Assistance Draft Policy Statement]. 
 152. Id. The Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, established by the 
Executive Committees on Peace and Security and on Humanitarian Affairs, was charged with 
developing a policy for victim assistance and support in February 2005. Id. § A ¶ 1. 
 153. Id. ¶ 3. 
 154. Id. ¶¶ 8, 18, 20, 34. 
 155. Id. § B ¶ 42. 
 156. Id. ¶ 44. Alternative proposals include funds overseen by a Resident Coordinator/ 
Humanitarian Coordinator and victim assistance allocations in the mission’s budget. Id. § B ¶ 42. 
 157. Id. § B ¶ 14. See also id. § B ¶¶ 16–23. 
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by Moroccan peacekeepers” and fifty-nine others by U.N. personnel from 
Uruguay.158  
The Draft Victim Assistance Policy provides that where children are 
born of U.N. Staff or related personnel and a functioning legal system 
exists, the U.N. should assist in establishing paternity and obtaining a 
court order for child support.159 If no functioning legal system exists, the 
U.N. can assist through DNA testing of the child and the alleged father.160 
If the paternity of a U.N. staff member is established and the staff member 
does not comply with a court order for support, deductions from salary 
could be made or, if the member has been separated, “a calculated lump 
sum amount should be deducted from the staff member’s final 
emoluments and paid to the child or his/her mother or guardian.”161 If the 
paternity claim involves a member of a military contingent, the policy 
requires the U.N. to assist the child and the mother or guardian in making 
the claim and then forwarding it to the proper TCC authorities for 
consideration.162 
The policy falls short of the recommendations made by NGOs and the 
Zeid Report. In addition to a trust fund for victims and children who are 
born to the peacekeepers,163 Zeid recommended that soldiers found guilty 
of sexual abuse have their daily allowances garnished in order to 
contribute towards the trust fund.164 The TCC could then recoup those 
sums from the soldier involved.165 To date, the U.N. has not implemented 
either Zeid’s recommendations or the draft U.N. policy to provide 
assistance and support to the victims. The concern that such assistance 
might constitute an admission of peacekeeper misconduct has contributed 
 
 
 158. Editorial, Push to Make Dads of ‘Peacekeeper Babies’ Pay, THE WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, 
Mar. 26, 2005, at 15. 
 159. Victim Assistance Draft Policy Statement, supra note 151, at 14.  
 160. Id. Prior drafts of the victim’s assistance draft policy contained a proposal for comprehensive 
DNA sampling of all United Nations staff to help substantiate allegations of paternity or allegations of 
involvement in a sex crime. Id. at 2. This proposal built on the recommendations contained in the Zeid 
Report, but legal, ethical and human resource issues were raised, and the proposal was not adopted. Id. 
Pursuant to existing United Nations Staff Regulations and Rules, fines may be assessed against 
individual perpetrators and deducted from the staff member’s salary and/or final disbursement if the 
staff member has already been dismissed. Id. at 14. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. at 14–15.  
 163. ZEID REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 75. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
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to the delay.166 Prince Zeid has called this failure to adopt a policy 
“unacceptable.”167  
Refugees International, an NGO, commended the progress made by the 
U.N. but was particularly critical of the lack of victim assistance.168 Its 
report stressed that a cultural/behavioral change was necessary in addition 
to the policy and structural changes.169 It also noted that “[m]any of the 
victims of sexual exploitation and abuse do not see themselves as 
victims.”170 Rather, they are survivors because they are doing what they 
must to support themselves and their families in a hostile environment.”171 
Women in post-conflict countries should have the means to move beyond 
mere survival. The report urged donors to focus on providing income 
generating assistance for women,172 such as micro-credit schemes modeled 
on the highly successful programs in other post-conflict situations.173  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The issue of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeeping 
personnel has garnered the attention of governments, intergovernmental 
organizations, non-governmental agencies, and other public interest 
groups. However, more than a decade after reports of sexual abuse 
surfaced and several years after the Secretary-General announced the 
 
 
 166. U.S. STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 63, at 232. 
 167. July 2006 Press Release, supra note 150. In their report, titled Must Boys Be Boys? Ending 
Sexual Exploitation & Abuse in U.N. Peacekeeping Missions, Refugees International recommended 
that: (1) Public Information Directors design educational programs, in tandem with local women’s 
groups, regarding sexual exploitation and abuse; (2) these programs communicate their findings of 
exploitation and abuse investigations; (3) the U.N. strengthen confidentiality rules in order to better 
protect whistle-blowers; and (4) the U.N. create a position related to trafficking in peacekeeping 
operations. MARTIN, supra note 19, at 23–24. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 24. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id.  
 173. See generally Role of Microcredit in the Eradication of Poverty, G.A. Res. 52/194, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/52/194 (Feb. 18, 1998). The resolution notes that “. . . microcredit programmes have especially 
benefited women and have resulted in the achievement of their empowerment in a world where more 
women than men live in absolute poverty and that the imbalance continues to grow.” Id.; see also 
Press Release, The Secretary-General, Message on the Launch of the International Year of Microcredit 
(Nov. 18, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstat.asp?nid=1186 (“A small loan, a savings 
account, an affordable way to send a pay-cheque home, can make all the difference to a poor or low-
income family. With access to microfinance, they can earn more, build up assets, and better protect 
themselves against unexpected set-backs and losses. They can move beyond day-to-day survival 
towards planning for the future. They can invest in better nutrition, housing, health, and education for 
their children. In short, they can break the vicious circle of poverty.”). 
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U.N.’s zero-tolerance policy,174 the Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping 
Operations acknowledged that not all troop contingents were fully 
supportive of the zero-tolerance policy, particularly when it came to 
prostitution.175 Prince Zeid stressed that Member States must not view the 
issue as one of ephemeral or passing importance, but rather, it should be 
viewed as the serious topic that it is.176 However, he recognized that it was 
difficult to change the dismissive culture, which is “within ourselves, in 
our own countries and in the mission areas.”177  
Now that some light has been cast on the issue, it is hoped that serious 
reform will be implemented. In February 2006, John Bolton, U.S. 
Representative to the U.N. stated:  
[S]exual exploitation and abuse of women and children at the hands 
of U.N. peacekeepers is not an isolated incident—it is a widespread 
scourge which creates lasting victims, scarred for their lifetimes. 
The ‘boys will be boys’ attitude, which too long pervaded 
peacekeeping operations, must correctly be met with a zero-
tolerance policy.178 
On December 14, 2006, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution 
that “[e]xpressed serious concern over reports of a ‘culture of silence’ in 
some U.N. missions, stemming from the fear of punishment and 
retaliation,” and “calls on the UN to take all necessary steps to create a 
working environment that allows staff to report instances of abuse without 
fear of retaliation.”179 The Resolution also emphasized that, “despite 
 
 
 174. ZEID REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 44. While acknowledging that condoms are routinely 
distributed, it urges that such distribution of condoms to peacekeepers is misinterpreted. When 
condoms are distributed to troops, it should be emphasized that it is a strategy to combat transmission 
of HIV/AIDS and not to encourage prostitution. Id. 
 175. Press Release, U.N. Doc. SC/8649, supra note 63, ¶ 3. 
 176. Id. ¶ 4. 
 177. Id.  
 178. Press Release, United States Mission to the United Nations, Statement by Ambassador John 
R. Bolton, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse at the Hands 
of U.N. Peacekeepers: Translating Outrage into Action, in the Security Council U.S. U.N. DOC. 
035(06) (Feb. 23, 2006), available at http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/press_releases/ 
20060223_035.html. Bolton continued,  
[n]ow that we are aware of this problem, though, it is time to take this recognition and 
translate it into decisive action without delay. We should do so not just because we recognize 
the impact of such crimes on the success of a particular Mission, but because it is our moral 
and ethical responsibility to do as much as possible to prevent the sexual exploitation and 
abuse of women and children wherever it may exist. 
Id. 
 179. European Parliament Resolution on the Involvement of U.N. Forces in Sexual Abuse in 
Liberia and Haiti, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6 TA-PROV(2006)0606 (2006), available at http://www. 
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current measures and the U.N.’s long-standing ‘zero-tolerance’ approach, 
allegations of sexual misconduct persist, [and] that, unless the United 
Nations can put a stop to this behavior, it will have a detrimental impact 
on the credibility and moral authority of the institution as a whole.”180 The 
Resolution recognized that “ultimately, some Member States may reduce 
the number of their troops at a time when there is a strong need for peace-
keeping missions.”181 
While it is extremely unlikely that TCCs will cede jurisdiction over 
alleged criminal offenders within their military contingents, the U.N.’s 
position that TCCs alone are responsible for discipline of military 
peacekeepers, and that it is powerless to intervene, is no longer acceptable. 
The U.N. could impose sanctions, withdraw contingents, and blacklist 
states that fail to take action in a legally effective way. While this might 
result in the loss of troops from some TCCs, this factor must be considered 
in undertaking peacekeeping operations. Further, it has been suggested 
that the U.N. itself and the TCCs could be held responsible for violations 
of international humanitarian law by both civilian and military 
peacekeepers.182 
Allegations of sexual abuse have already tarnished both the reputation 
of the United Nations and the fine and difficult work of U.N. 
peacekeepers. Reform is called for. The tools and recommendations are 
available. If the U.N. is truly to live up to its promise, the will of Member 
States as well as the U.N. itself is crucial. While the issue of sexual abuse 
has been addressed in numerous Security Council resolutions, U.N. 
reports, and press accounts, allegations of sexual abuse and official 
inaction continue to escalate. It is crucial that abuse be eliminated, that 
perpetrators be punished, and that victims be compensated. At least in this 
instance, rhetoric must be translated into action, and that, as so often 
happens, too little, too late, is not repeated. 
 
 
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?Type=TA&Reference=P6-TA-2006-0606&language=RO.  
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. In his recent Hastings Law Journal article, Jaume Saura concludes that despite the possible 
narrow applications of the Bulletin, applicable when peacekeepers are engaged in hostilities, 
humanitarian law is still binding on U.N. operations beyond those listed in the Bulletin on the 
Observance by U.N. Forces of International Humanitarian Law. Additionally, despite the degree of 
protection afforded to U.N. troops by the Safety Convention, troops still must comply with the rules of 
international humanitarian law. Indeed, both the U.N. and the TCC have a duty to respect international 
humanitarian law. See Jaume Saura, Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 479, 529–31 
(2007).  
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